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Abstract: Physical layer based security design in wireless sensor networks have gained much importance since the past 
decade. The various constraints associated with such networks coupled with other factors such as their deployment mainly in 
remote areas, nature of communication etc. are responsible for development of research works where the focus is secured key 
generation, extraction, and sharing. Keeping the importance of such works in mind, this survey is undertaken that provides a 
vivid description of the different mechanisms adopted for securely generating the key as well its randomness extraction and 
also sharing. This survey work not only concentrates on the more common methods, like received signal strength based but 
also goes on to describe other uncommon strategies such as accelerometer based. We first discuss the three fundamental steps 
viz. randomness extraction, key generation and sharing and their importance in physical layer based security design. We then 
review existing secure key generation, extraction, and sharing mechanisms and also discuss their pros and cons. In addition, 
we present a comprehensive comparative study of the recent advancements in secure key generation, sharing, and 
randomness extraction approaches on the basis of adversary, secret bit generation rate, energy efficiency etc. Finally, the 
survey wraps up with some promising future research directions in this area. 
Keywords: Channel impulse response, Information entropy, Randomness extraction, Received signal strength, Wireless 
sensor network. 
 
1. Introduction 
Due to the impetuous advancement of technologies in the last years, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have become a 
reliable and mature technology, widely used in several applications ranging from industry to military and home. In a typical 
deployment, the sensors are battery-powered microsystems that embed a variable number of transducers to monitor their 
surroundings. The sensors also embed a wireless radio and form a wireless network autonomously, through which they 
communicate their sensed data. One or more sensor(s) in WSN are also connected to the internet or to other external 
networks, and act as gateways for forwarding the sensed data to remote users. In some applications, WSNs need to work 
unattended for long periods of time, either to reduce the costs of maintenance, or because they are deployed in hardly 
accessible (or even hostile) places. Furthermore, some of the sensors may be deployed on mobile objects (either robots, 
animals, vehicles etc.) and are thus mobile. 
 Despite their versatility and usefulness, WSNs are vulnerable to attacks. In particular, the broadcast nature of wireless 
communications used by the sensors make them highly prone to attacks by adversaries, for example, confidentiality or 
availability of sensed data may be breached. Therefore, providing security to WSNs has become an inevitable requirement of 
their design. On the other hand, this requirement is difficult to achieve due to the constrained resources of sensors in most 
applications leading to conventional security schemes being hardly applicable. As a matter of example, the use of asymmetric 
cryptography and authentication is a challenging task for very low power sensors. 
A prime issue in security design of WSNs is generation of secret keys and their sharing because of the restrictions posed 
by the sensor nodes as mentioned earlier. On the contrary, as shown by the recent developments, the generation of secret keys 
may take advantage of the intrinsic randomness of the physical layer or environment in which the sensors operate. One of the 
most notable example is given by the received signal strength (RSS), which is an indicator commonly used in sensors’ radios. 
In this case, the combination of a strong decorrelation of the wireless channel in time and space and the variability of the 
environment itself (for example due to the presence of moving people or objects) makes the RSS readings vary in an 
unpredictable way. This fact, combined with the reciprocity properties of the wireless channel makes a pair of RSS readings 
collected at the same time by two communicating sensors highly related as well as opens the way for a number of methods 
that extract randomness from the RSS readings to generate secret keys [1-4]. These methods leverage on the reciprocity of 
the wireless channel to facilitate the key’s sharing, and they rely on the unpredictability of the RSS fluctuations to make the 
keys hardly identifiable by other sensors. The measurements of RSS are however not the only potential source of randomness 
from which a sensor can leverage to create keys. For example, the sensors can exploit the on board transducers to extract 
randomness from the measurements of the surrounding environment [5-8]. Also, with these methods however, the issue is 
how to deal with the predictability of the measurements and how to share the keys that are generated. 
In the existing literatures, a number of issues relating to channel reciprocity based key establishment technique are 
reviewed. In [9], Shehadeh, and Hogrefe reviewed existing physical layer based secret key generation techniques. In 
particular, they reviewed mainly two types of secret key generation techniques, namely: (i) RSS based key generation, and 
(ii) channel impulse response (CIR) based key generation. In addition, they reviewed few latest key generation mechanisms 
such as random channel hopping based mechanism. Similar to [9], Wang et al. [10] reviewed existing physical layer based 
key establishment techniques for wireless networks. However, unlike [9], the authors reviewed the existing works under three 
categories, namely: (i) quantization methods used to form secret key from wireless channel reciprocity, (ii) reconciliation and 
privacy amplification methods used to handle communication errors, and (iii) the feasibility and security issues related to 
channel reciprocity based key establishment techniques. In contrast to [9, 10], our work differs from the previous efforts in 
terms of emphasis and comprehensiveness. In particular, the taxonomy of physical layer based security design approaches 
described in this survey is depicted using Figure 1. We summarize our main contributions as follows: 
• Initially, unlike [9, 10], we classified the existing physical layer based security design issue into three categories, namely, 
secret key generation, sharing, and extraction. We then briefly discuss about the three fundamental steps i.e., generation, 
sharing, and extraction and their importance in the physical layer based security design. 
• Unlike [9, 10], we present the latest achievements on secure key generation, sharing, and randomness extraction 
approaches particularly in WSNs. Most importantly, unlike [9, 10], we focus especially on the methods based on RSS, 
frequency selectivity, and CIR not only because these methods are more mature, but also present other methods that 
exploit the measurements obtained by the on-board transducers. We also discuss the pros and cons of the existing secure 
key design approaches. 
• We present a comprehensive comparative study of the recent advancements in secure key generation, sharing, and 
randomness extraction approaches on the basis of number of parameters like type of nodes, adversary, secret bit 
generation rate, secret bit mismatch rate, energy efficiency etc. 
• Finally, we identify the future research trends for the benefit of both general and expert readers. 
This survey work is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly explain each of the three fundamental steps viz. 
randomness extraction, key generation and sharing and their importance in designing of physical layer based security 
mechanisms in WSNs. In section 3, existing physical layer based security design methods are discussed; these include RSS 
measurement, frequency selectivity, and CIR measurements etc. Section 4, provides a broad picture of future research 
directions. Finally, the survey is concluded in Section 5. 
2. Overview of Physical Layer Based Security Design 
The design of physical layer based security mechanisms for WSN involves three primary steps, i.e., key generation, 
randomness extraction, and sharing. Key generation refers to the different mechanisms that are implemented for efficient on-
line generation of secret keys in WSN. Traditional approaches for key generation are not suitable for WSNs due to the severe 
resource constrained nature of such networks. Several concepts are being used for key generation in WSNs by exploiting the 
physical characteristics of wireless channels [11]. Such physical properties are in the form of multipath fading, reciprocity of 
the wireless channel, path loss etc.These physical properties are sources of randomness [1, 4, 9]. Such random sources form 
correlated random processes, which are shared between two parties and decorrelate rapidly if the physical parameter is 
changed. In this way, the output of the random process is unknown to anyone at different physical positions, and can 
therefore be used as a shared secret. Strong decorrelation of channel behaviour in both time and frequency domains is 
exploited for achieving the purpose of secret key generation. Very fast decorrelation is found to occur in the measured RSS 
and using this property the attacker is evaded, as it is unaware of RSS estimations of legitimate nodes [1]. The channel 
response measured at the receiver is considered a frequency and position-dependent random variable that carries some 
information entropy and can be utilized as a source of randomness [5, 7]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of physical layer based security design approaches in WSNs 
 
In WSNs, efficient and secure key distribution [12] is required for allowing key establishment in a simple manner. 
Existing works in this field have concentrated on using conventional security measures that include installation of secrets by 
the user manually, their imprint during the production process or by use of public key cryptography. It has been found that 
adversaries in most of the cases take the advantage of disproportions arising out of performance related issues coupled with 
the broadcast nature of wireless channel for launching attacks (e.g., flooding that directly consumes resources). Another 
approach utilizes the properties of wireless channels as useful security primitives. Depending on the mobility pattern and the 
transmission frequency, if the channel response between the two transmitters is sampled over a short time interval, it is 
observed that both the transmitters generate highly correlated estimates. Wireless channel reciprocity results in correlated 
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measurements of the channel statistics at both transmitters. Also, the channel response is affected in an unpredictable manner 
by the physical environment and multipath fading. Therefore, two transmitters are able to generate shared secrets from their 
inherent physical behaviour irrespective of computational capabilities of adversaries. The messages exchanged between the 
two legitimate transmitters do not contain any content; rather they are used to provide channel statistics. This approach 
provides an alternate mechanism for generation of symmetric secret keys without depending on asymmetric cryptography. 
All the mechanisms described above demand for arbitrary movements of sensors for generation of secret keys. Nevertheless, 
in WSNs, as sensors are generally static in nature mainly due to application specific requirements, the advantage of physical 
environment is taken into account in such scenarios. Different events such as human movements make an impact on the 
signal propagation in an unpredictable yet correlated manner. This makes it possible for legitimate transmitters to take the 
benefit of such an advantage as a source of randomness for obtaining new shared secrets. Randomness extraction refers to the 
different mechanisms that are used to obtain random numbers from the environment for generating the keys. Extraction of 
randomness from the wireless channel needs bi-directional measurements [11]. Most of the works involving key extraction 
have made use of a single transmitter and a single receiver. Randomness extracted from channel measurements were first 
suggested in [13]. Some of the channel characteristics that are used for randomness extraction are measurement of phase, 
channel impulse response, amplitude gain etc. Challenges involved in randomness extraction include time correlated nature 
of channel measurements that reduce the cryptographic strength of the key (unless this is accounted for in the algorithm 
design) and the non-reciprocities which occur due to the half-duplex nature of the channel measurements. For the second 
challenge, for ensuring complete agreement between the two generated secret keys, information reconciliation [14] is 
generally used to correct a small number of discrepancies without giving away the entire secret key. 
The main features [15] that enable the extraction of randomness from radio communications are the following: 
– Reciprocity of the wireless radio channel: The different multipath properties of the radio channel, e.g. gains, phase-
shifts, and delays are identical in both directions of the link at any point of time and on any given frequency channel. 
– Temporal variations in the radio channel: With progress in time, the multipath channel changes that occur because of 
movement at either end of the link, and also due to motion of people and objects in the environment near the link. 
– Spatial variations: The properties of the radio channel are unique to the locations of the two endpoints of the link. 
3. Source of Randomness/Entropy 
According to information theory, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. The average 
amount of information that is obtained on observation of the outcome of the random variable is quantified by entropy. A 
typical measure of entropy of a random variable X, over the set of n symbols 1 2, , , nx x x  is given by [1, 3, 12], 
     21 log
n
i ii
H X p x p x

   
where  ip x  is the probability of occurrence of ith symbol ix . For binary symbols, a value close to 1 indicates high entropy 
[3]. For easy reference, we summarize the notations in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of the used notation  
Notation Description 
X Discrete random variable 
 H X  Entropy of X 
 ip x  Probability of occurrence of ith symbol ix  
jC  CIR measurement at jth pair of location 
 
 The wireless channel is a source of randomness with non-uniform distributions of outcomes due to the unpredictable 
multipath propagation and the resulting fading behaviour of wireless channel as well as randomness of the RSS. Entropy 
measurements provide a measure of the randomness of the channel that is used for secret generation, randomness extraction 
and/or sharing of keys. 
Many works have been reported so far that deal with the issue of secret generation, randomness extraction, and sharing. 
All these works have been conducted through different approaches based on different channel characteristics [9, 16, 17]. 
Some of these characteristics are RSS, multiple phases or frequencies, amplitudes or gains of signals. Out of these, RSS is 
most commonly available because of low device cost and it can easily be measured on a per-packet basis with off-the-shelf 
hardware. Nevertheless, as RSS is extracted from a single frequency, thus, it can only provide coarse-grained information of 
the radio channel, resulting in low bit generation rates. On the contrary, multiple phases and gains of signal based approaches 
have considered leveraging the whole information provided by the multipath channel. In this case, the whole channel 
response is represented by either gains or phases of the different channel responses. Hence, a higher number of secret bits are 
expected to be extracted by leveraging the whole channel response. In this survey, we have categorized the existing works 
mainly by three approaches (based on their commonality in approaches) viz. RSS, multiple phases or frequencies, multiple 
amplitudes or gains of signal(s). In addition to these three approaches, several other approaches were proposed to generate, 
extract and share secret keys based on some properties of the physical layer of wireless communication. A number of state-
of-the-art works belonging to each of the above mentioned approaches are reviewed in the next and subsequent sub-sections. 
3.1 Secure Key Generation Strategies 
In general, secure key generation strategies in the literature can be broadly classified into three main classes: (i) RSS based 
strategies [1-4, 18-22], (ii) frequency selectivity based strategies [5, 6, 23, 24], (iii) channel impulse response based strategies 
[7, 8, 25-30]. Further, in recent years, different innovative approaches were proposed by authors for secret key generation 
such as reverse pilot signaling [31, 32], bit error rate fluctuation [33, 34], chinese remainder theorem [35-37], reactive 
jamming [38, 39]. In this section, we have elaborated each of these categories of classes. At present, it became a common 
practice to use the nomenclature Alice, Bob, and Eve to refer to the legitimate transmitter, intended receiver, and 
unauthorized eavesdropper, respectively. In our survey, we also consider the same nomenclature in describing the existing 
mechanisms.  
3.1.1 RSS 
RSS is by far the most commonly measured channel characteristic because RSS measurement capability is built into sensor 
nodes. In this section, we illustrate the state-of-the-art secure key generation mechanisms based on the philosophy of RSS 
variation. 
 A cyber-physical approach for secret key generation is proposed in [1]. This approach utilizes the properties of the 
physical world and includes these properties while designing lightweight security protocols. It utilizes the signal strength 
fluctuations resulting from dynamic physical environments, e.g. environments experiencing human movements. This work 
addresses the following- (a) secret key extraction by designing a robust key generation protocol for static WSNs that takes 
into account events occurring in the environment, (b) protocol implementation by using sensor devices and evaluating the 
same in a real environment, (c) analysis of data collected with respect to primary factors that influence the rate of successful 
key exchange, and (d) evaluation of an adversarial strategy for combating the RSS based attack. Real life experimental 
evaluation is done by analyzing the effect of various moving patterns on legitimate devices and an eavesdropper. The 
scenario considered is crowded in nature where randomness is extracted from the movement of persons for sharing new 
secrets between the sensors. The received power is considered as shared information between the transmitter and the receiver 
under the hypothesis of signal propagation on a symmetric channel [18, 19]. This work leverages RSS variation resulting out 
of disturbing events that cross the line of sight for generating shared secrets between pairs of sensors. Movement 
characteristics such as speed and direction of the disturbing event dynamically changes and cannot be understood beforehand 
by adversaries. Both environmental changes and channel reciprocity are considered in this work for allowing sensors to share 
secrets among themselves. The experimental scenario chosen for this work is shown in Figure 2. The line of sight between 
Alice and Bob is shown using a dotted line while three positions of Eve are considered, all equidistant from Bob. The 
vulnerability of the proposed scheme is analyzed by defining a new RSS attack, where the adversary desires access to the 
secret key establishment using a RSS sniffing process. The results of this work show that the fresh secret keys can be 
generated even in static WSNs using the human movements in the environment. Hence, the proposed mechanism can be 
applied to a wide range of scenarios where the sensor networks are deployed as a part of ambient intelligence applications, 
such as assisted living and building monitoring applications, i.e., where the physical environment is affected by frequent 
human movements. 
 
Figure 2: Generating secrets from frequent line of sight disturbances. 
 
 In [2], the authors proposed an algorithm for generating the key using RSS. The scenario which is best suited for the use 
of this algorithm is where the peers have very different computational resources. The adversary considered here is a global 
eavesdropper that has the ability of estimating the RSS values of the packets transmitted between two legitimate sensors. 
Also, the adversary is aware of the key establishment protocol and the parameters used by it. Initially, the authors perform a 
preliminary computation on raw RSS values and translate them into symbols. The translation is done with the help of two 
consecutive phases, namely averaging and quantization. Averaging is done by taking the equal-length batches of RSS 
measurements, and later the average computed from them is used as the batch representative. Quantization is involved with 
the translation of each batch representative into symbol. The final key is computed on the sequence of symbols. Authors 
show that the batch length and the number of symbols required to determine a key can be set arbitrarily. Also, they show that 
the batch length has an effect on the performance of the protocol. It is worth noting that the averaging and quantization 
operations reduce the difference of data collected at the two endpoints to a large extent. In this work, a single-round 
reconciliation is done where only one hash is transmitted between the two parties. An algorithm is used for sampling the 
input space of the hash function that produces statistical knowledge of the channel. The algorithm is evaluated using 
theoretical analysis and is validated through real world measurements. In the real world measurements, the authors 
considered two communicating components, viz. a non-constrained device (A) such as laptop and another device that has 
limited memory as well as computational abilities such as sensor node (B). The experimental scenario is illustrated in Figure 
3 where device A is placed at the center while device B has six different locations  1 6B , ,B . The position of the adversary 
is always shown as changing such that it can listen to all the communications between A and B. Based on the experiments, 
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the authors show that the proposed protocol generates high entropy bit at remarkable rates with minimal computational 
complexity requirements. 
 
Figure 3: Experimental scenario: a non-constrained device A at the center, six different positions  1 6B , ,B  considered for 
sensor node B and trajectory of Eve. 
 
More recently, S. T. Ali et al. [3] proposed a secret key generation scheme based on RSS measurement. In the proposed 
scheme, the keys are shared using near-perfect agreement to avoid reconciliation cost. The threat model for this work 
assumes the presence of one or more adversaries in the environment whose channel sampling time is same as that of 
legitimate sensors and they also have knowledge about the key extraction algorithm along with its parameters. Channel 
measurement asymmetries due to non-simultaneous probing of the channel by the two end points are analyzed. A practical 
filtering scheme is proposed to minimize the asymmetries of channel measurements. The filtering scheme is found to 
improve the signal correlation between the communicating pair of sensors without reducing entropy. This work demonstrates 
that the channel mismatch between the communicating pair is due to the time delay between the measurements at the two 
ends. For restricting bit generation to the periods of high motion-related fluctuation, a mechanism is used by the authors, 
where further reduction in disagreement in channel estimation is done, thereby virtually eliminating key-bit mismatch. 
Authors show that adjustment of activity threshold yields near-perfect key agreement by trading-off against key generation 
rate. In the proposed mechanism, the channel sampling is done in the course of routine transmission. Low complexity 
filtering controls the actual source of bit differences and channel entropy is created based on the human movement. Channel 
entropy is needed here for key generation. Experimental results exhibit that the scheme is of low cost and does not require 
dedicated channel sampling or information reconciliation. It is also able to generate high entropy key bits at a rate that is very 
much suitable for key renewal. 
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In order to satisfy users’ requirement for key generation rate and to use the wireless channel in an efficient way, Wei et al. 
introduced an adaptive channel probing system as shown in Figure 4 based on Lempel-Ziv complexity and PID 
(Proportional-Integral-Derivative) controller [20]. The authors used the concept of Lempel-Ziv complexity to obtain accurate 
estimates of the entropy rate. The PID controller is used to dynamically alter the probing rate to stabilize the key generation 
rate according to the user’s requirement. 
 
 
Figure 4: Workflow of adaptive channel probing system. 
 
Further, the authors build a mathematical model for channel probing and derived that the key generation rate is 
proportional to probing rate. Furthermore, they proposed a utility function and showed that the probing rate is inversely 
related to utility. Nevertheless, if a sensor wants to generate a key within a given time, high probing rate is required. A series 
of experiments are conducted by the authors to test the performance using different speeds, different mobile types, different 
sites and different key generation rates. Experimental results show that the proposed channel probing system can adaptively 
change its probing rate due to noise, interference, other channel impediments, human movement and environment dynamics. 
It not only satisfies key generation rate requirement, but also makes the probing process as efficient as possible. However, 
from the experiments, it is observed that the overshoot of key generation rate is a bit high. 
Key generation among a group of wireless devices leveraging RSS is proposed in [4, 40]. The RSS characteristics 
resulting from shadow fading is robust against some specific outside attacks and this feature is exploited in [4]. Authors 
consider a passive adversary whose task is to follow the trajectory of one of the communicating node’s and eavesdrop on the 
communication between a pair of sensors. The attacker is able to measure the radio channels used by the communicating pair 
of sensors. Also, it is able to obtain the key extraction algorithm together with its parameter values. Communication between 
mobile nodes which are not within each other’s communication ranges are achieved by employing relay nodes. The authors 
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defined a metric called DOSS which represents the difference of RSS measured at a node via different radio channels. These 
DOSS values are passed to other devices for facilitating key extraction without involving passing of RSS measurements 
directly. In this work, two protocols are proposed for enabling secret group communication. The protocols are namely star-
based and chain-based. They are developed by making use of RSS from multiple devices for performing group key 
generation collectively. In particular, the star-based collaborative key extraction is designed for scenarios where multiple 
nodes are within each other’s communication range. On the other hand, chain-based approach deals with scenarios where not 
all the nodes under consideration are within each other’s communication range, though they are interconnected through a 
mobile relay node. Authors developed two building blocks for their framework- fading trend based secret key extraction and 
relay node assisted collaborative key extraction. The normal RSS measurement technique is combined with threshold RSS 
measurements for obtaining secret keys. As the fading trend is similar or exact in RSS measurements between pair of nodes, 
this trend helps in better capturing the similarity, resulting due to channel reciprocity as against RSS measured values. Mobile 
relay node for key extraction is used by the authors when communicating pair of nodes cannot communicate directly. The 
mobile relay node is responsible for communicating with the pair of nodes and transmits DOSS values to them. The 
communicating pair of nodes uses the received DOSS values and the measured RSS readings for secret key generation. 
Experimental results show that the proposed method achieves lower bit mismatch compared to existing works. 
In contrast to earlier schemes, a novel secret key generation scheme is proposed in [21] based on fluctuation of RSS by 
using electronically steerable parasitic array radiator antenna. Here, fluctuation of RSS is controlled by the reactance values 
of the antenna. Further, the authors have improved their scheme in [22] by including a received signal strength indicator 
(RSSI) based interleaving scheme, which enables to acquire more randomized and stronger secret keys. Unlike the works [1-
4, 20], a few works [41-43] have considered multiple antenna enabled nodes to generate secret key. The purpose of using 
multiple antennas is to collect enough mutual information from the channel and subsequently use multi-level quantization 
technique on the collected information to enhance secret key generation rate. To confirm the enhancement of secret key 
generation rate, authors [42] have performed testbed experiments and results show that the secret key generation rate 
increases by four times in multiple antenna enabled nodes compared to single-antenna enabled nodes. 
3.1.2 Frequency Selectivity 
The phase differences and/or frequency at the receiver depend on the length of the multipaths, environment, and frequency of 
the signal. Thus, constructive interference on one given frequency can turn into complete destruction of the signal simply by 
using a different frequency. By measuring the channel response over several different channels, the specific multipaths 
increase or decrease the resulting signal phase and/or frequency at the receiver unpredictably. By frequency selectivity based 
strategies, henceforth, we mean the strategies that are based on measuring the phase differences and/or frequency at the two 
communicating peers. In this section, we provide description on potential secure key generation methods based on frequency 
selectivity. 
 
Figure 5: Experimental scenario: Alice and Bob are placed at some distant positions and Eve’s moves in close proximity (10 
cm) around Bob. 
 
In [5], the authors proposed a key generation protocol based on the frequency-selectivity of channel fading for indoor 
WSNs. The proposed protocol considers conventional off-the-shelf static sensors without additional equipments e.g., 
electronically steerable antenna, ultra wideband (UWB) radios. Channel selectivity is considered with respect to position and 
carrier frequencies. The practical advantage of this approach is that node movement is not required. The authors initially 
studied the amount of uncertainty the adversary faces. The average amount of information of a discrete random variable is 
obtained by using the idea of entropy. A stochastic model of the system is designed to get the secrecy of it based on RSS 
distributions of the measurements. A random vector is considered whose measurements are conducted on different 
frequencies. If on evaluation, the elements of the random vector are independent, the amount of uncertainty is directly 
obtained from the entropy values that are derived from individual frequencies. The resultant entropy values provide an upper 
bound on the joint entropy. To see the magnitude of the effects of these uncertainties, the authors conducted experiments 
where the position of Eve continuously changes while Alice and Bob try to communicate with each other (Figure 5). The 
scheme is designed keeping in mind the limited hardware capabilities of sensors. The authors also try to increase the error 
tolerance of their key generation scheme by using the mean of the collected RSS values. The mean value is designated as a 
random variable that is distributed depending on the features of wireless propagation. Multi-level quantization is also used for 
making nearby measurements equal. The key generation protocol works in three phases viz. sampling phase, key generation 
phase, and key verification phase. The channel state is obtained and correlated measurements are collected by the 
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authenticated nodes in the sampling phase. The deviations that occur in the sampling phase are corrected in the key 
generation phase and a secret bit string is formed. The key verification phase is responsible for ensuring correct key 
agreement. The error correction property of the proposed protocol is able to defend the effects resulting due to measurement 
errors and temporal activities. The protocol is implemented on MICAz motes and experimental results prove its robustness. 
In [6], Wilhelm et al. proposed a protocol based on the frequency selectivity of channel fading for key generation. Similar 
to [5], here also the authors considered WSN consisting of conventional off-the-shelf static sensors without additional 
equipments. A random vector is considered that is measured on various frequencies for increasing the volume of information 
between a pair of sensors. The amount of reciprocity is directly obtained using the entropy values from independent channels. 
This value is used to represent the upper bound of joint entropy and decrease the overall uncertainty of the adversary. It is 
known that wireless channels face correlated fading if the distance between the center frequencies is smaller than the 
coherence bandwidth. So, the authors have analyzed the dependency structure for determining the amount of uncertainty. In 
other words, the secret behind generation of keys by the protocol is analyzed. Authors have conducted measurements by 
sampling RSS values of different frequencies. Certain numbers of samples are also collected from the RSS values. The 
proposed approach does not depend on node movement as the basis of randomness. The protocol also has error correction 
property that is able to defend the effects of measurement errors and temporal effects. The error tolerance is enhanced by 
calculating the mean value of the RSS samples. The calculated mean is designated as the random variable that is distributed 
following Rayleigh or Ricean distributions. The protocol has three phases- sampling phase, key generation phase and key 
verification phase. In the sampling phase, the communicating pair of sensors exchanges sampling messages on the set of 
available wireless channels. Samples are collected in an interleaved manner to remove the noise. The key generation phase is 
responsible for using the information gathered from multilevel quantization that is used for producing an equal bit string on 
both sides. The key verification phase is used by both parties for verifying that the secret keys were generated successfully. 
It has been seen that to construct a good key generation scheme, accurate channel measurement is utmost necessary. To 
collect precise channel measurements, a dedicated set of hardware and antenna are essential, that alone can record accurate 
measurements. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the use of specialized hardware and complexity of the system. In this 
circumstance, Ambekar et al. [23] proposed a secret key generation method based on the variation of wireless channel 
without involving any specialized hardware. While proposing the scheme, the authors have assumed that the network consists 
of conventional sensors and passive adversaries. Here, the passive adversaries are considered as resourceful as sensors and 
can eavesdrop on all the communication between legitimates sensors, Alice and Bob. In the proposed method, Alice and Bob 
record the variations in the wireless channel. Based on the measured channel variation, both Alice and Bob construct the 
channel profile. The collected channel profiles are then enhanced by using a 1l -norm minimization technique [44]. The 
enhanced channel profiles are quantized into streams of bits to obtain the preliminary keys. In quantization, the threshold is 
determined based on the mean of all the values of the enhanced profile. Values above the threshold are quantized as 1 and 
below are quantized as 0. Finally, the preliminary keys are synchronized using a localized reconciliation technique and their 
privacy is amplified by generating secure hashes [45]. 
Wang et al. [24] proposed a secret key generation protocol based on the phase information of channel responses for both 
static and mobile environments. It is assumed that sensors cannot transmit and receive signals at the same frequency 
simultaneously. Also, each sensor possesses a single isotropic antenna and employs a maximum likelihood estimator for 
frequency and phase estimations. On the contrary, in this work, similar to [23], adversaries are assumed as passive. The 
proposed protocol supports both pair-wise and group key generations. The basic philosophy of key generation protocol is that 
channel response between two transceivers is unique and location-specific, and the transmitted signals from each other will 
experience almost the same fading in the phase. The pair-wise key generation protocol comprises of two timeslots for each 
key generation round. In each timeslot, each node transmits a unit-amplitude sinusoidal primary beacon. After receiving a 
beacon, a node estimates the channel phase information and converts the estimated channel phase information into bit 
vectors. Here, the estimated channel phase information is converted into bit vectors according to a pre-defined quantization 
method. Such bit vector generation operation continues for a pre-defined number of rounds, generating a key of pre-defined 
size that is finally shared between the nodes. 
On the contrary, group key generation protocol comprises of multiple rounds of pair-wise key generation protocol 
between a group head node and the other group nodes. At the end of each round, every group node possesses a pair-wise key 
and it continues until the rounds equal the number of nodes in a group. Finally, each node combines the pair-wise computed 
key to generate a group key of pre-defined size. One of the limitations of this group key generation protocol is that as the 
number of node increases in the group, the number of interactions between the nodes linearly increases. To alleviate the 
limitation, the authors proposed a slotted round-trip scheme for group key generation. In this scheme one node that is chosen 
as an initiator starts the key generation process and transmits the beacons from both clockwise and anticlockwise directions. 
As the sum of phase estimates obtained from clockwise and counterclockwise transmissions are nearly identical at each node, 
a common key is effectively generated. In order to enhance the robustness of the proposed scheme, the authors used 
cryptographic information reconciliation and privacy amplification tools [46, 47] to reconcile bit discrepancies and improve 
the randomness of the generated keys. The simulation shows that both the proposed pair-wise and group key generation 
protocols improve the analytical key bit generation rate by a couple of orders of magnitude. 
A novel secret key generation scheme is proposed using the channel reciprocity and the time-variant frequency 
characteristics in [48]. However, the proposed scheme is suitable for OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) 
system. Forman and Young [49] examined the secret key generation rate enhancement problem by exploiting frequency 
characteristics in a higher bandwidth channel. Thereafter, to enhance the secret key generation rate, they divided the 
wideband channel into number of different and independent sub-channels. Now, normalized phase of these sub-channels are 
quantized to obtain the secret key with enhanced generation rate. Similar to [24], Sayeed and Perrig [50], Shehadeh et al. 
[51], Wang et al. [52], Premnath et al. [53], and Zhanget et al. [54] also proposed a secret key generating method based on the 
phase information of channel response. However, the method proposed in [50] is particularly suitable for wideband channel, 
whereas the method proposed in [52] is specifically suitable for narrowband channel. 
3.1.3 CIR  
Unlike RSS, wireless link signature or CIR provides information about the amplitude or gain of different multipath channel 
components [55]. As such, many more bits can be extracted from each measurement. In this section, we describe state-of-the-
art secure key generation works based on CIR measurement. 
 Zhang et al. [7] proposed a secret key generation technique based on CIR measurements. In the proposed technique, the 
authors considered that both Alice and Bob are mobile and measured the wireless link signatures at different unpredictable 
locations and combined these measurements to produce strong secret keys. Here, the adversary, Eve is considered to be able 
to overhear conversation between pair of nodes. Also, the adversary may be present in locations where the transmitting or 
receiving node has been in the past or will be there in future. In this work, the CIR magnitude measurement is used as 
wireless link signature measurement which is actually a vector of 25 channel impulse responses measured over time. 
Both devices, Alice and Bob, are mobile and measure the CIR magnitude at j different pair of locations, where j=1,2,…,J 
and measured CIR magnitudes are stored in themselves. Let jC  be the CIR measurement of the wireless link between Alice 
and Bob when they are at any jth pair of locations. Therefore, Alice and Bob use a previously agreed upon and publicly 
known function of these measurements,  1 2, ,..., Jf C C C  to compute the shared key. As the mobility of Alice and Bob is not 
fully retraceable by Eve, therefore Eve will not be able to compute the secret key. The authors examined the proposed 
scheme by considering the three mobility models viz. random walk, Brownian motion and Levy walk. 
Further, the authors proposed a new Jigsaw encoding method to encode CIR magnitudes and reconcile the differences in 
the bits extracted between Alice and Bob. To reconcile the bits, Reed-Solomon forward error correction scheme is adopted in 
the work. Through quantitative analysis it is shown that when movement step size is longer than one foot, the measured 
wireless link signatures are mostly uncorrelated. Finally, the authors show that the proposed scheme efficiently generates 
very high entropy secret bits and that too at a high bit rate. 
In [8], Hamida et al. proposed a secret key generation method exploiting the reciprocity of UWB channel. Initially, 
through experiment, authors have validated the reality that secret key generation based on physical layer in a free-space 
environment will not work. It is due to the fact of insufficient channel variation in free-space environment. It is assumed that 
the attacker listens to all communications between legitimate nodes and is capable of measuring between itself and each of 
the communicating nodes. Thereafter, they proposed an adaptive quantization scheme for generating secret key from CIR 
measurement. In another work [25], Ye et al. proposed a secret key generation method exploiting the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) channels. Unlike the scheme illustrated above, in [26-28, 56, 57], the authors presented an 
interesting approach for secret key generation from CIR measurement in a multi-antenna, Multiple-Input Multiple-Output 
(MIMO) system. More interestingly, in [26], the authors have observed through simulation that the length of the established 
key grows as antennas are added. On the contrary, in [27], the authors have observed that channels with higher order of 
diversity (higher number of paths) are more suitable for secret key generation. Considering this observation, they proposed 
two secret key generation schemes. First one is based on channel quantization [50] and another is based on an intelligent 
Channel Quantization mechanism with Guardbands (CQG). It is mainly based on mitigating errors by the separation of the 
decision areas by guard bands. Further, CQG mechanism is examined by a group of authors in [29, 30]. In one such work 
[29], the authors investigated the performance of the CQG mechanism and found expressions for the key generation 
efficiency and the bit error rate, whereas in [30], the authors derived the optimal quantization and guard band parameters for 
the CQG mechanism. 
3.1.4 Reverse Pilot Signal 
In [31], Tsouri and Wulich proposed a reverse pilot signaling technique for generating secret key over single input single 
output wireless system. Initially, in the proposed technique, both the transmitter and receiver are synchronized. Thereafter, 
the receiver transmits a pilot signal towards the transmitter so that the latter can estimate the channel from itself to receiver. 
Based on the results of channel estimation, the transmitter sends a burst of M-PSK data symbols over the same frequency as 
the pilot signal. The receiver senses the received signal and generates secret key based on a priory known signal constellation. 
In order to compensate small changes during channel estimation, the receiver uses a decision feedback mechanism. Further, 
they investigate this key generation mechanism and derive the relation between the efficiency of the source, the coherence 
bandwidth, and the Doppler bandwidth. Through simulation, the authors have shown that the proposed technique achieves 
high key generation rate without any overheads on key distribution, enciphering and deciphering. 
Further, authors have extended their work in [32] by elaborating the scheme to support a plurality of transmitters in a 
superposition modulation setting with joint decoding at the receiver. They have shown that the elaborated protocol can be 
practically used to obtain information theoretic security with low implementation complexity, no memory requirements and 
no overhead on throughput and energy. 
3.1.5 Bit Error Rate Fluctuation 
A new secret key generation scheme based on the fluctuation of Bit Error Rate (BER) considering an OFDM signal 
transmission is proposed by Kitano et al. [33]. Initially, in the proposed scheme, communicating peers exchange information 
of channel characteristics among themselves. By interpolating in time at one of the peers, effect of the measurement in time 
difference is eliminated. Subsequently, the measurement is performed repeatedly at specific time interval to obtain multiple 
independent channel characteristics, and binary digitized values are generated according to the obtained channel 
characteristics. While transmitting the binary digitized values, authors have deliberately distorted the signal to introduce bit 
error, resulting in subsequent increase in bit error rate. They introduced distortion in signal by phase compensation at QPSK 
demodulation of all sub-carriers. The phase compensation at QPSK demodulation of all subcarriers is done by the detected 
phase rotation at the center frequency of the OFDM spectrum. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme successfully 
achieves the key agreement at SN ratio of 15dB in multipath fading environments and the fading frequency is less than 40 
Hz. In [34], similar to [33], the authors introduced phase distortion in signals for producing bit error.  
3.1.6 Chinese Remainder Theorem 
An interesting observation has been made by a group of researchers in their state-of-the-art works [35, 36] related to the 
Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) systems. They observed that in case of the FDD systems, the complex channel 
coefficients for transmitting and receiving signals are different. However, if the frequency separation is not too large, the 
transmitting and receiving signals exhibit the same directional dependence and the multipath angles are reciprocal in FDD 
systems. Considering this principle, Wang et al. [34] proposed a secret key generation method based on Chinese Remainder 
Theorem (CRT). They have utilized the reciprocity of the multipath angle and delay in FDD systems for the proposed 
method. Initially, the communicating peers collect the angles and delays of different multipath signals of each other. In the 
next step, both measured angles and delays of different multipath signals are quantized. Errors that occur during quantization 
process are now grouped and shared by communicating peers via public channels. Thereafter, a CRT based error correction 
method is used to generate the secret key from grouped quantization error. Authors have argued that as the secret key is 
generated from quantization instead of quantization result, thus the key will not be revealed to eavesdroppers. Through 
simulation, authors have shown that the proposed method improves the key agreement ratio of legitimate communicating 
peers even in presence of eavesdropper. In contrast to the earlier works [35, 36], Wang et al. [37] used the reciprocity of the 
wireless channel in Time Division Duplex (TDD) mode for their proposed scheme. Also, unlike [35, 36], a CRT based error 
correction method is used to generate secret key from the channel estimation error.  
3.1.7 Reactive Jamming 
Aiming at effective and faster generation of secret key, a channel independent method based on reactive jamming by the 
receiver is proposed by Gollakota, and Katabi [38] and Zheng et al. [39]. The basic philosophy of the proposed method [38] 
is that the sender transmits two OFDM symbols back-to-back. For each sample in these repeated transmissions, the receiver 
randomly jams either the sample in the original transmission, or the corresponding sample in the repetition. Since the 
eavesdropper does not know which signal sample is jammed and which one is clean, it cannot correctly decode the data. 
Nevertheless, the receiver knows which samples it jammed. Therefore, the receiver picks the correct samples from the signal 
and its repetition and rearranges them to get a clean signal, which it can decode using standard methods. The authors have 
examined different modulations such as BPSK, 4QAM, 16QAM, 64QAM and enhanced the efficacy of the proposed method 
by making it eavesdroppers’ location independent. Finally, through real implementation in indoor environment, authors have 
demonstrated that the proposed method achieves secret key generation rate 3~18 Kb/s with a 0% bit disagreement. 
 In contrast to the earlier scheme, Zheng et al. [39] proposed a secret key generation scheme where the destination node 
simultaneously acts as a receiver as well as a jammer. In particular, while receiving data, the receiver transmits jamming 
noise to degrade the eavesdropper channel. In the proposed work, the authors have considered that the source has single 
antenna whereas both the receiver and eavesdropper has multiple antennas. Also, it is assumed that the receiver operates at 
full duplex mode. 
3.2 Key Sharing Strategies 
In this section, existing secret key sharing strategies are discussed. 
3.2.1 RSS 
Barsocchi et al. [12] have introduced a security scheme that exploits the unpredictable and erratic behaviour of wireless 
communication for key generation and sharing. This work considers Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) scenarios. Key 
generation and sharing for both static and mobile sensors are considered. Static sensors form a portion of the infrastructure of 
the AAL system while mobile sensors are applied on the body of a person. In this context, static sensors implement complex 
key generation/distribution protocols and are subjected to constant monitoring as well as maintenance. Mobile sensors are 
allowed to dynamically enter/exit the AAL space as there is a possibility of their deployment on an elder or impaired person. 
Therefore, mobile sensors are much more prone to attacks and so providing security to these sensors is very crucial. The 
randomness that is introduced by the mobility of the user’s body greatly helps in the process of entropy harvesting for 
generation of keys. The scenario considered in this work consists of three main entities, namely user, adversary and smart 
space. Secure communication is requested by the user with smart space so that no adversaries can breach the user’s privacy. 
The smart space is essentially an intelligent environment envisioned to provide service to the users and is connected to the 
internet. It is characterized by Secure Network Infrastructure (SNI) that is composed of sensor nodes that can communicate 
securely among themselves. The user contains a sensor which communicates with the smart space via the SNI. On-board 
RSSI estimation capability is provided to the sensor’s radio for estimating the received signal strength of every received 
packet. The SNI authenticates the sensor of the user using the pre-loaded secret key. The adversary is assumed to be global 
eavesdropper and is responsible only for gathering as much information as possible avoiding code injection strategies for 
attacking. So, in this scenario security can be provided by introducing a fresh randomness i.e. a data unknown to the 
adversary. This scheme is implemented in a real-world scenario. It is effective against the adversary behaviour in four 
different cases: brute force on the on-fly packet, sensor compromise, RSSI guessing attack, and finally, symbols statistical 
analysis. Analysis shows how different factors affect the amount of randomness collected from the environment and also 
shows that guessing attacks from an eavesdropper are negligible. 
3.2.2 Frequency Selectivity 
The work in [58] uses the reciprocity of the wireless channel response between two transceivers as a correlated random 
variable. A random vector is formed from several frequencies and the shared secret key is derived from that random vector. 
Error correction techniques are applied to control the trade-off between the extent of secrecy and the strength of the protocol. 
The protocol is applicable in both static and dynamic networks. The probe phase of the protocol is responsible for collecting 
samples of the channel responses obtained from the available channels. The mean of every sample is also calculated. A set of 
samples is gathered for reducing the cause of temporal effects on the measurements. The maximum amount of entropy is 
extorted in the key generation phase using a suitable code having a specific tolerance. Depending on the error that can be 
possible in the measurements, a different parameter may be used for every channel. To ensure successful creation of the 
secret key, a challenge-response scheme is used in the acceptance phase. The protocol provides guarantee in finding a shared 
secret if the deviations between the sender and receiver are restricted. Here, sender and receiver are considered as static 
conventional sensors equipped with CC2420 radio transceiver chips using omnidirectional antennas. The performance and 
robustness of the protocol are proved by considering different distances with both line of sight and without line of sight 
connections. Experimental results show that the protocol is applicable on resource-constrained nodes and the use of channel 
response is stable as well as unpredictable for generating information on shared key. 
3.2.3 CIR  
Wilson et al. [59] were one of the first to propose a key sharing method called channel identification on the philosophy of 
theory of reciprocity for antennas and electromagnetic propagation. The authors have considered indoor environment and 
UWB CIR as a source of common randomness between sender and receiver pair. Initially, they revealed that, under some 
common UWB channel model, the secret key sharing rate is upper bounded by the mutual information between the 
observations of each receiver. Based on this fact, the authors derived expressions of mutual information between the channel 
observations, which form an upper bound on the average secret key rate under single and multiple propagation paths. Further, 
they examined the variation of average secret key rate as a function of the signal bandwidth. Interestingly, they found that the 
maximum secret key rate does not increase monotonically with signal bandwidth. Accordingly, they derived the optimal 
signaling bandwidths to maximize the sharing rate of secret key as a function of SNR for some typical channel excess delays. 
Finally, the proposed channel identification scheme is validated considering various public communication methods such as 
Reed-Muller, Trellis Codes and simulation results reveal that such channel identification scheme is feasible. Although, the 
secret key sharing method is validated in various public communication methods, however, the secret key extraction process 
is prone to errors and requires strong signals to work reliably. 
3.3 Randomness Extraction Strategies 
Due to the reciprocity property of electromagnetic propagation, the same key is expected to be derived by the communicating 
pairs. However, randomness extraction of secret key bits from noisy radio channel measurements at communicating pairs is a 
major statistical signal processing problem. Under this scenario, the communicating pairs obtained varied channel 
estimations, which may lead to some discrepancies in the derived keys. To overcome this problem, the researchers devised 
number of strategies based on RSS, CIR etc. In this section, we reviewed the recent approaches in this area. 
3.3.1 RSS 
The effectiveness of randomness extraction using RSS variations on the wireless channel between pair of sensors is evaluated 
by the authors in [60-62]. Particularly, in [60, 62], the authors have used real life measurements of RSS in different 
environmental settings considering passive adversaries. From their results the authors found that in some environments the 
extracted bits have very low entropy due to lack of variations in the wireless channel. They found that the bits obtained from 
low entropy were not suitable for secret key generation. Also, they found that prediction of randomness in static 
environments becomes easier for adversaries whereas in dynamic environments high entropy bits are obtained quite fast. The 
authors developed an environment adaptive randomness secret key extraction scheme that uses an adaptive lossy quantizer 
along with Cascade-based information reconciliation [63] and amplification [64]. The proposed randomness extraction 
scheme consists of three components viz. quantization, information reconciliation and privacy amplification. The scheme is 
implemented in two nodes. Specially crafted 802.11 management frames are used for communication in place of standard 
frames. The authors have designed their own acknowledgement receipt mechanism. Beacon frames are used between the 
sender and the receiver. The sequence number field of the beacon packet is used as the proposed protocol’s sequence number 
for handling packet loss and retransmissions. The communicating parties exchange twenty beacon frames per second. Finally, 
the authors show that the secret key generation rate is increased when multiple sensors are involved in the randomness 
extraction process. 
In [15], randomness extraction of secret key bits from noisy radio channel measurements between pair of nodes is 
addressed. The authors consider the problems of non-simultaneous directional measurements, correlated bit streams, and low 
bit rate of secret key generation. Here a framework named as High Rate Uncorrelated Bit Extraction (HRUBE) is proposed 
for interpolating, transforming for de-correlation, and encoding channel measurements using a multi-bit adaptive quantization 
scheme. This quantization scheme allows multiple bits per component. Three signal processing methods, namely Fractional 
interpolation, De-correlation transformation and Multi-bit Adaptive Quantization (MAQ) are used for bit extraction. 
Fractional interpolation induces various amounts of delay at every node for substantiating the fact that two directional 
measurements are not done simultaneously. De-correlation transformation is responsible for generating a measurement vector 
having uncorrelated components using Karhunen-Lo’eve transformation of the original channel measurement vector. MAQ 
performs the task of converting real valued channel measurements into bits based on the measured value. This is done using 
communication to facilitate agreeing of the two nodes on the quantization scheme. Here, all these processes are used for 
transforming correlated, real valued radio channel signal measurements into uncorrelated binary data at the two nodes. The 
combination of the methods is referred as HRUBE. The objective of quantization in this work is to obtain long length secret 
key and error minimization by lowering the probability of the secret key to such an extent that it does not match at the two 
nodes. Zero covariance between elements of secret key is also maintained here. Experimental data is used for proving the 
efficiency of this scheme. Similar to [60, 62], this scheme also works against passive adversaries. 
In another work [65], a group of researchers proposed a more robust bit extraction method, called adaptive ranking-based 
uncorrelated bit extraction, on the basis of HRUBE framework. Compared to [15], the proposed scheme reduces the non-
reciprocities caused due to different hardware characteristics by including a ranking step after the interpolation filtering. In a 
recent work, Zan et al. [66] examined the robustness of randomness extraction process by RSS measurement against active 
attacks. Unlike the existing works, authors have proposed a differential technique to derive secret key. Further, the same 
group of authors extended their work in [67] by introducing two agreement algorithms. The first algorithm allows two 
legitimate nodes to derive a common secret key through an information-theoretic manner. The second algorithm uses the 
channel diversity property to generate secret key between a central server and a node. Considering the secret key generation 
scheme proposed in [22], Yasukawa et al. [68] proposed a scheme to increase the randomness extraction rate. They have 
applied a multilevel quantization technique to achieve the same. 
3.3.2 Frequency Selectivity 
In [69], Shehadeh et al. proposed a randomness extraction mechanism based on quantizing the phase information of channel 
responses. To start with, they explored the effects of delay between the channel estimates at two nodes and node mobility on 
the performance of the key generation procedure. It is revealed that, in mobile scenario, the channel estimation needs to be 
performed in a very short period. Thereafter, authors studied the correlation between mobility and the randomness extraction 
of secret bits, and investigated the overall key generation rate as a function of the Doppler spread. They found that from a 
single channel observation as a function of the Doppler spread, leads to a lower average number of secret bits generation. 
Finally, through simulation, they confirmed that that mobility is in fact an advantage due to the faster decorrelation of the 
channel permitting a faster re-keying. The results demonstrated that the overall secret bit extraction rate increases as a 
function of mobility despite the lower average number of secret bits generated per single channel realization. 
3.3.3 CIR  
Ye et al. [70] developed two different techniques for randomness extraction of secrets from the channel state between a pair 
of nodes in a richly scattered wireless environment. In the first technique, a simple algorithm entitled as level crossing 
algorithm is proposed. The level crossing algorithm is based on the observation of correlated excursions in the measurements 
between a pair of nodes. The authors have incorporated a self-authenticating mechanism in the algorithm to prevent 
adversarial manipulation of message exchanges during the algorithm. The proposed level crossing algorithm is well-suited 
for environments that can be characterized as Rayleigh or Rician fading models associated with a richly scattered 
environment. Since, in the first technique, the time-varying nature of the channel acts as the source of randomness, it limits 
the number of random bits that can be extracted from the channel for the purpose of a cryptographic key. To overcome the 
limitation of the first technique, the authors proposed the second algorithm. This second algorithm is motivated by 
observations from quantizing jointly Gaussian processes, but exploits empirical measurements to set quantization boundaries 
and a heuristic log likelihood ratio estimate to achieve an improved secret key generation rate. The proposed second 
algorithm is applicable to more general distributions for the shared channel information between a pair of nodes, and is able 
to achieve improved secret key extraction rates at the tradeoff of increased complexity. The adversary considered for this 
work mainly deals with passive attacks. Finally, the authors validated both proposed algorithms through experimentations 
using a customized 802.11a platform, and showed that the reliable secret key establishment can be accomplished at the rate of 
10 bits/second. 
Similar to [26-28], Chen and Jensen [71] have also considered the MIMO system and proposed an interesting 
randomness extraction scheme from CIR measurement. The paper further discusses several error reduction techniques such 
as gray coding, least-square estimation, channel averaging, and LDPC codes that can efficiently enhance key agreement 
between multiple-antenna nodes. A different attempt has been made by Ye et al. [72]. They proposed a randomness 
extraction scheme by measuring CIR from jointly Gaussian random variables. They derived the secret key capacity as a 
function of the received Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). More recently, Liu et al [73] proposed a randomness extraction 
technique by quantizing the amplitude of OFDM subcarriers. Experimental results reveal that the proposed technique is able 
to achieve higher key extraction rate compared to RSS based technique. Finally, the authors show that the proposed technique 
is resilient to predictable channel attack [60], and stalking attack [4]. 
3.3.4 Accelerometer 
In [74], Owusu et al. have shown that accelerometer readings are a powerful side channel that can be used to extract secret 
key between a pair of nodes. This possesses two difficulties: privacy invasion through unauthorized access and the fact that 
the accelerometer does not require special privileges for accessing operating systems. They have devised a predictive model 
that is trained for only acceleration measurements of password entry. Inference accuracy is evaluated as a function of number 
of parameters like sampling frequency of the accelerometer etc. The proposed application is compliant with the Android 
developer in terms of use. This application has two collection modes: area and character. The area mode interface consists of 
a 10×6 array of buttons. The size of the buttons is similar to the size of the buttons found on standard Android keyboards. 
The area mode data collection screen is developed mainly for two reasons: (i) for evaluating the inference accuracy at 
different levels of granularity for obtaining information about the noisy accelerometer data streams, and (ii) for quantifying 
the fact that certain regions of the screen reveal more information about keystrokes given a specific typing style. The 
character mode interface is made up of a QWERTY keyboard arranged similarly to the Android soft keyboard screen. The 
character mode is considered the testbed for the keystroke reconstruction attack. Here, data analysis consists of three main 
phases, namely preprocessing, feature subset selection, and classification. Data collection was done from four participants 
using the HTC ADR6300 node. Participants were all regular smart phone users between the ages of 18 and 30. For the area 
mode inference experiment, data was collected for about 1300 key presses, where each one of the 60 screen areas received 
approximately 20 positive samples. Participants were instructed to press keys in any order until all of the keys received at 
least one press prior to each data collection run. K-fold cross-validation was used for testing. For the character mode 
inference experiment, training data was collected for about 2700 key presses. For getting uniform sampling intervals 
throughout, the dataset linear interpolation is used. Interpolation provides smoothing of data that defends baseline signal 
noise in the data. Preprocessing the raw acceleration measurements produces a modified dataset. Feature selection is done by 
obtaining the set of 46 features for every preprocessed acceleration stream. The first eleven features summarize the 
acceleration stream information for each dimension separately. For ensuring selection of an optimal set of features for the 
classification task, the Wrapper feature subset selector is used [75]. The Wrapper algorithm is combined with a classification 
algorithm and is responsible for performing exhaustive searches through the feature space for the set of features that 
maximizes a pre-specified “evaluation measure”. Here authors have considered evaluation measure as the cumulative 
classification accuracy of their model. Classification operation is involved with selecting acceleration streams that correspond 
to particular touch events. A feature vector is taken as input where the output is a prediction label. In the area mode analysis 
keystrokes are identified as a hierarchical classification problem. Each area of the screen is divided into two portions 
recursively. Individual keys are then classified within each new sub-area. Key accuracy of every subdivision is calculated by 
taking the cumulative product of the accuracies for each subdivision. Authors show that accelerometer measurements can be 
used to extract 6-character passwords using a few trials. 
3.4 Summary of Performance 
In earlier sections, existing works on entropy harvesting and key generation and sharing under various categories were 
discussed. It is worthy noting from the above discussions that the RSS based security design mechanisms are dominating than 
other categories as they are easily obtained from wireless device drivers [1-4]. Since no additional hardware is required in 
RSS based scheme, the RSS based security design mechanisms are cost saving. Further, it is seen that the RSS based security 
design is equally effective in both static and mobile scenarios [1, 18]. Although, the RSS based security design mechanisms 
are applicable only for pair-wise key generation, however it is capable of generating secret key at fair rate. On the contrary, 
the CIR based security design mechanisms are most suitable in static scenario compared to mobile scenario [7, 8]. Even 
though, the CIR based security design mechanisms are capable of providing high key bit generation rate, but such 
mechanisms require advance channel estimation technique and time synchronization. Similar to RSS based methods, 
frequency selectivity based security design techniques are equally effective in both static and mobile scenarios [24, 52]. In 
addition, these mechanisms are capable of securing both the pair-wise and group communications. However, frequency 
selectivity based security design technique can only provide coarse-grained information of the radio channel and thus key bit 
generation rate is very low. To provide an overall comparison, we summarize the pros and cons of these three physical layer 
based secure key design mechanisms in Table 2. 
Table 2: Pros and Cons of different secure key design approaches 
Category Advantage(s) Shortcoming(s) 
RSS based 
• RSS readings are readily available in the 
existing wireless infrastructure and thus, it 
makes key generation using off-the-shelf 
devices feasible without significant hardware 
modifications. 
• RSS-based schemes are more robust to 
synchronization issues. 
• RSS based methods either use only the deep fades 
or RSS measurement above or below the 
threshold, the other samples are all discarded.  
• RSS based methods that are only applicable for 
pair-wise key generation. 
• The key bit generation rate supported by RSS-
based methods is low. 
Frequency 
selectivity based 
• Frequency selectivity based approaches work in 
both static and mobile environments. 
• Support both pair-wise key and group key 
generation. 
• Single frequency can only provide coarse-grained 
information of the radio channel and do not 
provide sufficient entropy in practical 
environments. 
CIR based 
• CIR based methods do not require device 
movement during key establishment. 
• The key bit generation rate supported by these 
approaches is high. 
• CIR based methods require advanced channel 
estimation techniques and time synchronization. 
 
Since different experimental methods like testbeds, simulations are used by the authors to evaluate the performance of 
the proposed mechanisms, thus posing a difficulty for finding a common ground to evaluate them. It is worth noting that a 
quantitative comparison of these algorithms is infeasible on account of a lack of information given by the authors. Hence, for 
a better understanding, we compared the performance of the discussed schemes on the basis of the following parameters: 
design approach, types of nodes, adversary, secret bit generation rate, secret bit mismatch rate, energy efficiency, 
communication overhead, and processing overhead. The comparison of existing physical layer based secure key generation, 
sharing, and extraction techniques are presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The not available (N/A) entry in Tables 3, 
4, and 5 indicates that a particular scheme does not measure the metric while evaluating the performance of the proposed 
technique. Note that this section is not meant to be an exhaustive evaluation comparison of the state-of-the-art mechanisms. 
This is left as a future work. 
• Design approach: The design approach metric indicates the key philosophy of the proposed physical layer based secure 
key design schemes such as RSS, CIR, frequency selectivity etc.  
• Type of nodes: It indicates whether static and/or mobile nodes are used by the authors during devising the schemes. An 
adversary can set up different types of attack on the network such as node capture attack, denial-of-service attacks and 
each of such attack focuses on different goals depending on their knowledge on the resource-limitation of the sensor 
nodes. The attacks can be classified in different ways but generally they are passive or active [76]. Passive attacks aim to 
obtain transmitted information by eavesdropping without disrupting the protocol operations. On the contrary, active 
attacks are involved in the alteration process by the adversary or creation of false messages.  
• Secret bit generation rate (BGR): BGR represents the number of secret bits extracted/generated per measurement.  
• Secret bit mismatch rate (BMR): For key extraction between a pair of communicating nodes, BMR is defined as the 
number of bits that do not match between two nodes divided by the number of bits extracted from quantization process 
[73]. For group key extraction, it is defined as the averaged bit mismatch rate from all pairs of nodes in the group [73]. 
• Energy efficiency (EE): Energy is a critical resource of WSN since it is one of the main elements that define the 
survivability of the network. Deciding if a security technique is suitable for a specific application highly depends on the 
energy efficiency i.e. how efficiently energy consumption is taking place during the protocol’s functionality. 
• Communication overhead (CO): Each physical layer based security design mechanism follows its own approach based 
on the application’s objectives and requirements. These procedures create communication overhead with the messages 
that need to be exchanged between nodes during the setup, data forwarding and maintenance phases of each procedure. 
Therefore, the algorithms that evaluate how many messages are transmitted are considered under this criterion. This may 
be a concern for security related packets, e.g. key setup, control and data packets. 
• Processing overhead (PO): The security design approach taken by each mechanism creates a computation overhead 
related to the processing of signals and quantization. These are aspects that are calculated by protocols that assess the 
processing overhead of their approach. 
Table 3 shows the comparison of physical layer based secure key generation protocols on the basis of parameters 
mentioned in earlier paragraph. It is worth noting from the table that the RSS, frequency selectivity, and CIR based security 
mechanisms are more mature than other techniques. Although the RSS, frequency selectivity, and CIR based security 
mechanisms have been extensively evaluated in the literatures, proposed solutions both theoretical and practical ones have 
several limitations. In fact, many approaches rely on strong assumptions which generally do not hold in practice, such as the 
densely crowded environment considered in several papers. Further, in nearly all cases, it is assumed that the legitimate 
nodes, Alice and Bob have collected a sufficiently large number of channel estimates which also does not hold in practice. As 
shown in Table 3, nearly all the RSS – with the relevant exceptions of [4, 24], and reverse pilot signaling based security 
mechanisms are more energy efficient than the other categories. It is due to the fact that the mechanisms in these categories 
have low communication overhead and moderate processing overhead. Also, it is noticed that CIR based mechanisms have 
least BMR and high processing overhead- except [5]. Furthermore, the frequency selectivity based mechanisms exhibit a high 
BMR, and at the same time, achieves a moderate performance in terms of its energy efficiency, and communication 
overhead. Finally, it is shown that the recently developed security mechanisms such as fluctuation of BER, CRT, reactive 
jamming are most suitable in static scenario compared to mobile scenario, and at the same time achieves a moderate 
performance in terms of its energy efficiency except [36]. 
Table 3: Comparison of secure key generation protocols 
Schemes 
Design 
Approach(s) 
Type of 
Nodes 
Adversary BGR BMR EE CO PO 
Barsocchi et al. 
[1] 
RSS 
Static and 
mobile 
Passive N/A 0.1 High Low Low 
Barsocchi et al. 
[2] 
Static Passive 0.278 NA Moderate Low Moderate 
Ali et al. [3] Mobile Passive 0.083 1~8 Moderate Low Moderate 
Liu et al. [4] Mobile Passive 2 0.029~0.073  Low High High 
Mathur et al. [18] 
Static and 
mobile 
Active and 
passive 
10-7 < 1 High Low Low 
Aono et al. [21] Mobile N/S 0.333 2 Moderate High Moderate 
Zeng et al. [42] Mobile Passive 0.3~0.8 0.1 Moderate Moderate High 
Wilhelm et al. [5] 
Frequency 
selectivity 
Static N/A 20~40 0.03 Moderate High Moderate 
Wilhelm et al. [6] Static N/A N/A N/A Moderate Moderate High 
Wang et al. [24] 
Static and 
mobile 
Passive > 100 0.15 < Low High High 
Forman and 
Young [49] 
Static N/A 640 N/A Moderate Moderate High 
Shehadeh et al. 
[51] 
Static Passive 90 0~0.9 Moderate Moderate High 
Wang et al. [52] 
Static and 
mobile 
Passive 150~650 2~5 Moderate Moderate High 
Zhang et al. [7] 
CIR 
Mobile Passive 2.59~5 0.0032~0.038 Moderate Moderate High 
Hamida et al. [8] Mobile Passive 1 N/A Moderate Low High 
Wallace [27] Static Passive  0~0.1 0~0.01 Moderate Moderate High 
Wallace et al. 
[28] 
Static Passive 7.3~16.9 0~0.001 Moderate Moderate High 
Wallace et al. 
[57] 
Static Passive 0~0.1 0~0.1 Moderate Moderate High 
Tsouri and 
Wulich [31] Reverse pilot 
signaling 
Mobile N/A 20~40 N/A Moderate Low Moderate 
Tsouri and 
Wulich [32] 
Mobile N/A 20~40 N/A High Low Low 
Kitano et al. [33] Fluctuation of 
BER 
Static N/A 11 0~5 Moderate Moderate High 
Kitano et al. [34] Static N/A 80 N/A Moderate Moderate High 
Wang et al. [36] 
CRT 
Static Passive 40 0~0.01 Moderate Moderate Low 
Wang et al. [37] Static Passive  1~10 0~0.1 Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Gollakota, and 
Katabi [38] Reactive 
jamming 
Static Active 3000~18000 0.01~0.0001 Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Zheng et al. [39] Static Passive 6 N/A Moderate High Moderate 
 
Table 4 shows the comparison of physical layer based secure key sharing mechanisms on the basis of parameters 
mentioned earlier. It is worth noting from the table that only a handful number of works has been proposed so far. To 
summarize, CIR based strategy shows high BGR and low BMR compared to the other two strategies. It is expected as CIR 
based security mechanism utilizes advance channel estimation strategy to share secret bits. Further, it is noticed that CIR 
based security mechanism exhibits high energy efficiency, and at the same time, provides low communication and processing 
overheads.  Similar to CIR based mechanism, RSS based mechanism also exhibits high energy efficiency, and at the same 
time, provides low communication and processing overheads. Nevertheless, the BGR is significantly less in RSS based 
mechanism compared to CIR based mechanism. Further, it is noticed that the BMR is fairly high in RSS based mechanism 
while it is significantly less in frequency selectivity based mechanism. Finally, it is shown that frequency selectivity based 
mechanism achieves a moderate performance in terms of its energy efficiency, communication overhead, and processing 
overhead. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of secure key sharing protocols 
Schemes 
Design 
Approach(s) 
Type of 
Nodes 
Adversary BGR BMR EE CO PO 
Barsocchi et al. [12] RSS based 
Static and 
mobile 
Passive 0.9~1 1 High Low Low 
Wilhelm et al. [58] 
Frequency 
selectivity 
based 
Static Passive N/A 0.05 Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Wilson et al. [59] CIR based Mobile  Passive 95~150 0.5~0.06 High Low Low 
 
The comparison of physical layer based secure key extraction techniques is shown in Table 5. Similar to the earlier two 
tables, same parameters are considered in Table 5. It is worth noting that except RSS and CIR based mechanisms, none of the 
other techniques are extensively studied by the researchers. Even though the RSS, and CIR based security mechanisms have 
been rigorously evaluated in the literatures, proposed solutions have several limitations. In fact, most of the approaches rely 
on strong assumptions which generally do not hold in practice, such as Eve cannot be very close to either Alice or Bob while 
Alice or Bob are extracting their secret key. Further, in nearly all cases, it is assumed that Eve cannot jam the communication 
channel between Alice and Bob which actually does not holds in practice. To summarize, except RSS based strategies, nearly 
all the strategies except [62] show fairly high BGR and less BMR. It is expected since in RSS based security mechanism, 
RSS measurement above or below a threshold is discarded, resulting in low secret bit extraction rate. Finally, it is noticed that 
nearly all RSS except [15], CIR except [73], and accelerometer based security mechanisms exhibit moderate energy 
efficiency, and at the same time, provides high communication and processing overheads. In contrast, frequency selectivity 
based mechanism exhibits high energy efficiency, and at the same time, provides low communication and processing 
overheads. 
Table 5: Comparison of secure key extraction protocols 
Schemes 
Design 
Approach(s) 
Type of 
Nodes 
Adversary BGR BMR EE CO PO 
Patwari et al. [15] 
RSS based 
Static Passive 22 0.482 Low High High 
Jana et al. [60] 
Static and 
mobile 
Passive 0.533 0~0.55 Moderate Moderate Low 
Premnath et al. 
[62] 
Static and 
mobile 
Active 0.055~0.4 0.02~0.24 Moderate Moderate Low 
Croft et al. [65] Static Passive  0.38~1 0.01~0.07 Moderate Moderate High 
Zan et al. [66] Mobile Active 100~150 0.005~0.02 Low High High 
Shehadeh et al. 
[69] 
Frequency 
selectivity 
based 
Mobile Passive 45~67 0.5~0.001 High Low Low 
Ye et al. [70] 
CIR based 
Static and 
mobile 
Passive 9~13 0~0.16 Moderate Moderate High 
Chen and Jensen 
[71] 
Mobile Passive 5~20 0.01~0.001 Moderate High Moderate 
Liu et al. [73] 
Static and 
mobile 
Passive 60~90 3~5 Low High High 
Owusu et al. [74] Accelerometer Mobile Passive 29~60 N/A Moderate High Moderate 
 
 
4. Future Research Directions 
This section summarizes the different areas for secret key generation, randomness extraction and sharing that can be explored 
in future. 
– Cyber physical systems are emerging as a promising area for secret key generations that are drawing the attention of 
researchers. Many areas such as entropy and probability of key agreement relationship, analysis on how radio source 
interferences can affect secret key agreement etc. can be taken up by researchers. 
– Wireless networks are very much prone to different kinds of attacks. In this perspective more work can be done 
considering several attacks that have not been addressed till now as very few works have undertaken specific attacks that 
can be launched by adversaries in the context of key generation, randomness extraction or sharing. 
– Exploiting multiple antenna diversity for studying opportunistic channel probing in wireless networks along with 
application of other amplification techniques for efficient key combination can be interesting topics for future research. 
– Secure key generation in the physical layer is a topic that has not been deeply explored so far. Also the possibility of real 
implementations of CIR-based key generation needs to be validated. 
– Security issues in the physical layer for multiuser systems have been dealt with by very few works. For example, 
improvising the robustness of key extraction mechanism in the physical layer by introducing mobility is an interesting 
area of research that can be carried out in future. Also the application of the existing physical layer techniques in 
commercially deployed wireless systems needs to be tested. 
– Another field of research that has not been explored to a large extent is the cross-layer issues while handling secure key 
generation, randomness extraction or sharing. 
– For body area networks the study of multi-party key agreement between communicating devices and countermeasures 
against active attackers are areas that demand the attention for future research. 
– Another important area that has been largely unexplored is what role active attacks such as jamming may play while 
information bits are exchanged during the key setup phase. This is because the active adversaries can very much 
eavesdrop on the communication as well as disrupt message transfers. So, mechanisms need to be devised to overcome 
such adversaries so that crucial communication leading to key generation, randomness extraction or sharing is not 
affected. 
5. Conclusion 
WSNs have become an important area of research since the last decade and many new areas are being explored that will 
facilitate the use of such networks in real life implementations. These networks are susceptible to various forms of attacks 
mainly because of their broadcast nature of communication and deployment in areas inaccessible to human beings. As such 
different physical layer based security techniques have been devised in the past that ensure secure generation, sharing and 
extraction of keys used for communication in WSNs. This survey work deals with the objective of providing a vivid 
description to readers on works that deal with secure key generation, randomness extraction and sharing of keys involving 
different mechanisms. It mainly draws the attention of works that involve the mechanism of variations in the received signal 
strength followed by other methods such as frequency selectivity and other innovative techniques such as accelerometer 
based. Finally, the survey winds up giving possible directions of future work in this area. 
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